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ANTHONY CUNNINGHAM 
Great Anger 
T HEY ARE ANGRY. AND THEIR ANGER drives them to extreme deeds. Pub-licly dishonoured by Agamemnon, Achilles withdraws from the siege 
ofTroy and refuses to take up the fight even when the tides turn against his 
comrades. Only Patroclus's death can call him back so that he can unleash 
his wrath. Even Hector's death cannot satisfy the enraged Achilles. He must 
defile the slain body; such is his fury that the gods alone can protect it. When 
Euripides's Hecuba suffers a betrayal by a guest-friend and can find no justice, 
she too must have her revenge. She blinds Polymestor, the Thracian king, 
and coldly kills his children, taking pleasure in his grief Hecuba is dead 
but for revenge. In Medea's case, anger is more monstrous. Tossed aside by 
Jason, the lover for whom she has sacrificed everything, she desperately seeks 
a way to hurt him. Killing his bride cannot suffice. She takes her children's 
lives, his children, so that she might have sweet revenge. 
The stories are ancient, but the themes of anger and revenge are 
familiar to modern ears. Human history is fraught with sobering cruelties: 
senseless murders; brutal rapes; horrific child abuse; vicious racism; the 
obscenity of genocide. War and other atrocities claimed the life of over one 
hundred and eighty million people in the twentieth century. There seems 
no denying that those devoid of anger and desires for retribution when 
the innocent suffer must simply not care. And yet, when we consider how 
anger, hate, and the thirst for revenge have figured in history, we can hardly 
avoid the conclusion that they have been the mightiest contributor to what 
might easily be seen as a history of inhumanity. 
Other forces have also been major players in our cruel deeds. Greed, 
fear, indifference, and glory have lent a helping hand. Nevertheless, various 
schools of thought have rightly surmised that anger, particularly anger hard-
ened into implacable hate, has been first among equals. The Stoics viewed 
anger as an inherently corrosive element in the soul. Even righteous anger 
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sees only evil; the evildoer is just an extension of evil. Lost in anger's eye are 
the complications of what led the wrongdoer to the vile deed. Anger's eye 
cares nothing for keen attentiveness to the details that might explain, soften, 
and plead for mercy and compassion. Anger sees a monster, and seeing only 
a monster can bring out monstrous things in us. Even if beastly revenge is 
denied, anger eats away at the soul, consuming and corroding character. 
The Christian tradition may seem more ambiguous. The Old Testa-
ment is no stranger to anger, and even Jesus angrily cast the moneychangers 
from the temple. Nonetheless, the dominant message of the New Testament 
is one of love. Every sinner is a child of God. We may hate the sin, but 
never the sinner. Hate ignores the divine in every person and turns a blind 
eye to the possibility of repentance and redemption. As Jesus warned, let 
those who are without sin cast the first stone. Judgment is God's business; 
good Christians should busy themselves with God's command to love thy 
neighbour. 
The Buddhist tradition also appeals to a common denominator. We 
identify with the corporeal self, but this self is just an illusion. Our true self 
is one we share with all sentient beings. If we can realize this fundamental 
truth, we can identify with all creatures and love them accordingly. Anger 
toward others makes no more sense than the right hand hating the left. Just 
as the Stoics insist that the state of one's character is what matters, Buddhists 
insist that one's state of mind is paramount. Enlightened beings leave anger 
behind when they see beyond the illusions that foster anger and hate. 
Mahatma Gandhi added his voice and actions to these traditions 
by extolling the powers of unconditional love. The ideals of ahimsa and 
satyagraha demand more than a refusal to act from anger. Anger must be 
expunged from the heart and replaced by relentless love, a love that cannot 
be denied to even the most brutal oppressor. Anger and hate can never win; 
violence can never beget moral victory. Love, and only love, is the answer to 
suffering and oppression. Unconditional love can eventually melt the heart 
of the most vicious tyrant, even if the road is a long and arduous one. 
As suicide bombers claim lives and people nurse ancient wounds with 
ethnic cleansings, a world devoid of anger and distinguished by universal 
love and respect seems sublime. But like all visions of utopia, it suffers in the 
face of reality. Had the vision the power to capture our hearts and minds, 
we would still need to know what to think and feel about Stalin or Pol Pot. 
Even the best of all psychologically possible worlds might not eliminate the 
man who raped Nancy Venable Raine: "Now I hear the words. These are the 
words I hear: Shut up shut the fuck up you bitch you dirty bitch you fucking 
cunt shut up do you hear me you fucking dirty bitch Tm going to kill you if you 
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don't shut up you bitch Tm going to kill you." 1 He left Nancy Venable Raine 
her life, but he stole her soul. What might we say about anger, hate, revenge, 
and forgiveness? A believer in the vision of an anger-less world might tell her 
to let go of her anger and forgive this man. But the thought oflooking her 
in the eye and mouthing these words shames me, and not simply because 
these words would not be mine to say. The thought of forgiving this man, 
much less returning love for evil, seems like an empty platitude. 
Thus, there can be no denying that anger has caused immeasurable 
anguish. Yet, anger seems like a firring reaction for those who genuinely 
care when faced with threats and losses at the hands of those who mean to 
do them. The question of how anger should figure into a life and character 
is one of the most important questions we can ever face. 
At its root, anger is an emotional mobilization in the face of threat 
or loss. Other emotional states share this root. Fear manifests our anxiety 
about the potential for loss. Despair expresses the resignation that loss is 
inevitable and hope futile. Grief embodies the acknowledgement of the loss 
that fear and despair portend. Anger also faces some threat or loss, but anger 
rebels against it. Like these other emotional states, anger involves dissatisfac-
tion, but there is a hostile, aggressive element to the dissatisfaction. We can 
understand the adaptive advantages of anger. In a hostile environment, we 
must prepare for flight and fight. Fear and anger provide a spirited element 
that can help us survive. Fear prepares the body for flight, and anger readies 
us for combat. The body's somatic changes all serve the cause of making us 
ready. As beings for whom some things matter, we must defend what we 
hold dear, and anger mobilizes these defences. 
For the most part these capacities for fear, anger, and mourning seem 
to be part of our hardwiring. But these emotional capacities also require 
development and cultivation. The Greek idea of catharsis often conjures 
up the idea of purging emotions. Yet, the best way to think of catharsis 
is to think of the education of the emotions. Greek tragedies and similar 
experiences can shape an emotional life by inculcating an appreciation of 
what things matter and by calling out the requisite emotions to honour 
these things in the right way, at the right time, to the right degree. We need 
no education just to feel anger, but without some cultivation, anger can 
wreak havoc on us. Hot weather, growing old, indigestion, and bats in my 
attic can make me mad. With these things we hope for some perspective: 
Keep an eye on what matters, don't get worked up over lesser things, head 
1 Nancy Venable Raine, After Silence, Rape & My journey Back (New York: Crown Publish-
ers, 1998) 9. 
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off heartache, and learn to live gracefully with losses, including the erosion 
of your powers and eventual death. In other words, we hope for wisdom. 
Some things matter more. Some things are out of our control, others are 
difficult to control, and others can be managed with effort and a modicum 
of luck. Wise people direct themselves to what matters, duly cognizant of 
their own fallibility and fragility. 
Wayward fear, sadness, or anger can produce skewed perspectives 
in the unwary, the unfortunate, or the unwise. These emotions manifest a 
way of seeing the world. Cognitive distortions find expression in distorted 
emotional lives, and distorted emotional lives distort the world. Paranoid 
people see fearful things behind every corner. They filter experience in ways 
that highlight and magnify threats and harms. Likewise, severely depressed 
people often see impotence, inadequacy, and despair in all things. In the 
same way, chronically angry people ferret out threats and losses that feed 
their anger. The fact is that anger in all its forms can be distorted. People 
can experience anger for no good reason. Or anger may be fitting, but the 
degree may be excessive. And anger's response can be inappropriate; what we 
do in anger can go far beyond what anger warrants. Anger can suffer from 
these distortions episodically, but anger can also be chronically distorted. 
We see this most dramatically and tragically with mad hate, cases where 
anger has hardened into a deeply entrenched, dogmatic antipathy. 
Consider genocide. Many things can start the wheels of genocide, but 
anger and hate usually provide the momentum. The genius of the Holocaust 
was that once the system was in place, the machine could run on its own 
without constant infusions of hate. Unlike so many other massacres, this 
one did not require hate at some fevered pitch. Nonetheless, anger was the 
background accelerant that made the Holocaust possible. Nazi Germany was 
not a nation of sociopaths. Many of those responsible for the administra-
tion of the camps were physicians. How could they kill innocent people? 
The answer is simple, though the psychological labyrinths are complex. 
Nazi Germany nursed its anger with a systematic prejudice against the 
Jews. Conflicts of interest, envy, disappointment, personal distaste, and 
fear can demonize the 'other.' The need for unambiguous enemies can be 
powerful, even narcotic. When this happens, the details of differences and 
conflicts can be pushed aside for over-generalizations chat corroborate the 
desired conclusions. Such cognitive distortions manufacture the picture one 
wishes to see. With the Holocaust, the Jews became the epitome of evil and 
pestilence. 
Such collective distortions find ready analogues in individual lives. 
Lives are often ruined by misplaced, overblown, twisted, shameful, and 
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pathetic anger. The Greeks were right to suggest that emotions need educa-
tion. This is so for anger, and the world would be better if such an education 
were the rule. So imagine that such an education puts an end to senseless 
anger. Henceforward, think of great anger in the sense of profound anger 
in the face of some genuine, important harm or wrongdoing. Notice that 
an end to petty, mindless, immature anger would not keep human beings 
from doing terrible things. Avarice and fear alone would be enough to 
make people ravage each other. And so long as there is genuine oppression, 
cruelty, and wrongdoing, most of us do not believe that any such education 
should banish anger altogether. Thus, what are we to say to and about the 
desaparecidos in South America, the millions slain in Stalinist Russia, the 
victims of Nanking, or the countless victims of the African slave trade? 
One response is to adjust our forms of caring. Any education of the 
emotions must include the emotions of caring, and perhaps caring could 
be immunized against great anger. This approach finds a clear expression in 
the Stoics. Only our character is fully within our power, and its perfection 
should anchor our lives. Anything external to character should be pursued 
with reservations. We mustn't care about anything in ways that might lead to 
the disintegration of our character if the objects of our affections meet with 
bad ends. We can care, bur not in ways that might alter our character. 
While Stoics must confront the charge that they leave out all the love, 
Christianity is known for its preoccupation with love. However, Christian-
ity is committed to the view that life is a preparation for eternal life with 
God, and this commitment affects love for Christians. Eternal life matters 
most. Indeed, earthly and eternal life can hardly be compared; the latter is 
different in kind, and not simply degree. This has important consequences. 
While some see an incompatibility between Christian love and capital 
punishment, the two are theoretically reconcilable because of the strict su-
periority of eternal life. Christians must see repentance and redemption in 
this life as essential preparation for the next. They can never endorse capital 
punishment from hate. But the threat of execution could drive the reflec-
tion necessary to save one's soul. In the film, Dead Man Walking, Matthew 
Poncelet refuses to take responsibility for his role in the brutal murder of a 
young couple. Only when his execution is imminent does he repent. 
The key point to notice is that Christian love cannot condone hat-
ing Poncelet. The gravity of his sins must be leavened by two ideas. First, 
the tragedy of these murders is an earthly one. The lesser good was taken, 
but the greater good, eternal life with God, took its place. Christians can 
mourn the separation from loved ones, but they must also be happy for 
them. Poncelet did them no lasting harm. He deprived them of earthly life, 
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but given the superiority of eternal life, the loss must pale to insignificance. 
Faithful Christians mourners cannot weep for them. Second, while Christians 
can feel righteous anger and hate Poncelet's sins, they mustn't hate Poncelet 
himself 
Like Christianity, Buddhism stresses love, a love that diffuses anger 
and prevents hate. We attach ourselves to particular people and see them as 
all-important. When those we love meet with bad ends, we incline toward 
anger and revenge. But what grieving, angty parents fail to realize is that 
Poncelet and their children are one. We share in the essential unity of all 
sentient beings. Unfortunately, we build lives around illusions, pernicious 
illusions that foster enmity. If we could see beyond the illusion that we are 
all separate, isolated beings, we would love Poncelet just as much as his 
victims. 
No doubt there are Stoics, Christians, and Buddhists that could bring 
a Matthew Poncelet to justice without anger or hatred. The real-life Helen 
Prejean befriended those who inspired the Poncelet film character. She did 
not lose sight of their humanity, even though she saw their actions as sin-
ful. But Sister Helen Prejean was a nun, not a mother. If someone were to 
abduct my child, rape her, torture her, thoughts of character, the afterlife, 
or illusions about the self would be far from my mind. As loving parent, a 
goodly portion of my life is about my child. No grieving parent could find 
sufficient comfort in good character, heaven, or the unity of all things to 
eliminate loss. Of course, Stoics, Christians, or Buddhists might insist that 
debilitating grief or vengeful anger testify to mistaken beliefs about what 
or how much things matter. Frankly, even if claims about mistaken evalu-
ations are correct in some sense, I am unsure what difference the truth of 
these claims could make to a life in progress. Assume that my love for my 
child provides a large part of the sense and meaning to my life. What kind 
of 'fact' could a loving parent learn that would somehow banish grief and 
anger by rendering a child's death into something that doesn't matter enough 
to warrant debilitating grief or vengeful anger? This change would require 
a conversion, a metanoia, where core attachments and commitments are 
drastically altered. Any such person would become a different person. Of 
c~urse, changes of heart can be welcome. Had Stalin fallen off a horse like 
Saul and changed his ways, the world would have been a better place and 
Stalin a better man. Typically, changes of heart take place over time. Oskar 
Schindler did not start out as a humanitarian bent on saving Jews. His 
change of heart mightn't be as profound as the change needed for a loving 
parent to banish grief and anger, but the example suggests that dramatic 
change is possible. The question is whether such change is desirable. 
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If an end to vengeful anger requires the elimination of caring and 
not simply its alteration, few people would heed the call. The Holocaust 
mattered, just as the wrongs done to Nancy Venable Raine mattered. Stoics 
might refuse to acknowledge the value of external things. But others, includ-
ing Christians and Buddhists, would not withdraw from caring. Indeed, 
Christians and Buddhists would likely stress the expansion of care, rather 
than its elimination. One way that an expansion of caring might work is 
by way of forgiveness. The details of the case for forgiveness can vary. One 
strain of thought stresses the psychological survival and well-being of victims. 
The thought is that anger and hate create stress that devours victims. Life 
and character require emancipation from the wounds of wrongdoing; we 
cling to anger at our own peril. Another strain casts forgiveness as a posi-
tive force and not simply a matter of staving off destruction. Forgiveness is 
seen as a gesture of control and dignity. If my psyche is consumed by anger 
and hate driven by the deeds of others, perhaps they control my life. The 
decision to forgive can restore control and express my dignity to control 
my fate and character. 
We should be clear about forgiveness since contemporary con-
versations suffer from a great deal of loose talk. For one thing, forgiving 
and forgetting are different things, and many appeals to the well-being 
of victims often seem closer to the latter. Any sense of forgetting cannot 
be a literal banishment from memory. Presumably the idea would be that 
victims would do best to put the wrongdoing away from their mind and 
move on. Advice to 'forget about it' can make sense. The advice is apt when 
the wrong is not so serious and there is real danger that a victim is unduly 
fixed on the wrong. In such cases, the best thing that victims can do is put 
the experience behind them; the costs of hanging on to wrongs or working 
through them can be too great to warrant the efforts. However, when the 
wrongs are traumatic, 'forget about it' does no justice as a piece of advice. 
Traumatic wrongs attack a victim's sense of a secure moral order. Studies 
with victims of trauma like torture show that there can be no recovery by 
wilful banishment. Indeed, trauma can change the brain in ways that create 
a sense of being 'stuck.' People who work with victims report that construct-
ing a narrative that provides the possibility for an emotional reckoning is 
paramount for recovery. Thus, the last thing that victims of serious wrongs 
should wish to do is forget their experience, even if they could . 
The fact that people so often talk about 'forgiving and forgetting' 
in the same breath suggests that we acknowledge some difference between 
the two, but that we also link them. The sense of'forgetting' has to do with 
not keeping the wrong waiting in the wings, ready to wield at a moment's 
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notice. This idea works in tandem with forgiveness because true forgiveness 
involves a change of heart where you no longer hold something against a 
person. There is no rejection of a judgment of wrongdoing. If you change 
your mind and conclude that you were not wronged, then there is nothing 
to forgive. Forgiveness entails a judgment of wrongdoing, together with the 
banishment of any claim against the wrongdoer. Genuine forgiveness wipes 
the slate clean. 
There is little doubt that an inability to forgive wrongs would be a 
flaw in character. We are not creatures who can reasonably expect perfec-
tion in others. People are destined to disappoint us, just as we are bound 
to disappoint others unless we set our sights low. When the wrongs are 
minor, a refusal to forgive is a flaw. Even with more serious wrongs, we can 
imagine cases for forgiveness. If the details are right, we can imagine an 
end to anger and another chance for the wrongdoer. Victims must beware 
the pitfalls of hanging excessively on the hurt. But important as the pos-
sibility of forgiveness is, those who sing its praises also should be careful 
to get the tune right. Some may believe that evil always has its roots in a 
cycle of cruelty and callousness that might be destroyed if it could only be 
interrupted by mutual understanding and a shared commitment to peace. 
This vision, noble as it may be, cannot be squared with Stalin, a man who 
burned the midnight oil composing lists of Russians to be killed in the wee 
hours of the night. Gandhi would tell us that love could melt this man's 
heart. I think not. Gandhi faced Churchill, not Stalin. To anyone else who 
would embrace the idea of unconditional love and forgiveness, consider 
this: What would it mean to forgive the man who raped Nancy Venable 
Raine? The true believer in the goodness of every person might insist that 
even a man capable of such brutality is capable of repentance. I doubt it. 
The chasm between such cruelty and genuine remorse seems psychologi-
cally unbridgeable. And convincing me otherwise would require more than 
a profession of faith. Such unprovoked brutality is no accident. It has roots 
and one might trace them if one knew enough about the assailant. One 
might even identify key crossroads and make meaningful conjectures that 
but for this or that event in this man's life, he would not have become this 
kind of man. Yet, this genealogy would change nothing about the assess-
ment of his character or the character of his actions. In real life and not 
some dreamland, we should not expect to find a repentant soul should this 
man ever be caught. His actions were hardly the actions of a man torn by 
conflicting desires. For any save those dogmatically attached to forgiveness 
as a panacea, asking this woman to forgive this man would be an obscen-
ity. 
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Just thinking about Nancy Venable Raine's experience should be 
enough to move good people. The likely reaction is equal parts sadness 
and indignation, sadness for her profound losses and indignation for the 
monstrous cruelty that spawned these losses. Human pathos and inhumanity 
move good people, even at a distance. And the interest good people take 
in oppression, brutality, and injustice goes beyond some detached, dispas-
sionate judgment that some important moral principle has been flouted. 
What we feel says everything about who we are, and good people cannot 
witness such things without feeling sympathy and indignation. 
If we are lucky, the distance between these deeds and us is great. As 
respectful, caring people, we are saddened and angered by such abomina-
tions. But the distance holds anything like profound rage at arm's length. 
Rage is a double-edged sword. We abhor the rage of Nancy Venable Raine's 
assailant. But if we were closer to the wrongdoing, if we were victims, a 
victim's loved ones, or a victim's liberators, might our own anger turn into 
a rage that might transform our character? Might the Stoics have been right 
about anger, and might we all be Medea, Hecuba, and Achilles in waiting? 
These victims are consumed and undone to one extent or another by rage. 
We should reconsider these ancient characters to see if they have anything 
important to say. 
Euripides's Medea has disturbingly familiar elements. All we need do is 
tinker with the genders. Men kill their lovers far more often than women kill 
theirs. In the vast majority of cases, women kill their lovers in self-defence. 
Men most often cite infidelity or a fear of infidelity as a primary reason for 
domestic violence and homicide. Fata/Attraction notwithstanding, men are 
more likely to resort to violence against unfaithful lovers or against former 
lovers in the aftermath of abandonment. Of course, Medea does not kill her 
lover. But what stops her from doing so is the desire to hurt him. Review 
the basic story. Medea falls in love with Jason and helps him procure the 
golden fleece. With her father in pursuit, Medea kills her brother, Absyrtis, 
and casts his dismembered body into the sea. She knows that Aeetes will 
cease the chase to give him the proper burial rites. When they return to 
Jason's homeland, Medea uses her sorcery against Jason's uncle, Pelias, who 
has usurped Jason's throne. She tricks Pelias's daughters into killing their 
father. Having burned another bridge, they make for Corinth, and Medea 
bears Jason two sons. But Jason abandons Medea and marries the daughter 
of Creon, the king of Corinth. He justifies his actions as an attempt to secure 
a future for his sons, but the explanation is unconvincing. At this point, 
there is no escaping the fact that Jason is handing Medea a raw deal. She 
has sacrificed mightily for him and now she is to be cast aside. Out with 
the old and in with the new. 
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As she contemplates how to take revenge, she has moments of 
conflict about killing her sons. But the thought ofJason's wrongs steel her. 
Ultimately, Medea has her violent revenge and flees Corinth with the dead 
bodies of her children after showing them to Jason. Even if Medea is right 
that her pain will be greater than the pain given Jason, this does nothing to 
change the fact that revenge rather than her children's good rules the day. 
Raging hate can be like this. Yet the appropriate response to Medea's rage 
is that anger can never be better than the angry person. Medea's excesses 
are an indictment of neither anger nor love. A good person might think of 
many ways to punish Jason. But killing one's children would not be one of 
the ways. Medea's attachment to Jason is such that she cannot acknowledge 
the importance of any competing concerns and loves. She must have Jason 
no matter what. When her love is thwarted, her children become little more 
than a means to exact revenge. This is twisted love, a form of moral madness. 
As such, it inspires revulsion, not pity. Medea proves nothing about anger 
except that great anger can widen pre-existing cracks in character. Modern 
readers may sympathize with Medea as a woman done wrong by a man and 
admire her refusal to accept the wrong passively. But the details speak against 
sympathy or admiration. It is one thing to admire Medea's fighting spirit 
as a powerful woman who refuses to suffer wrongs and indignities without 
some response. It is something else to look past her specific deeds. 
Euripides's Hecuba is a very different story. By the end of the play, 
Hecuba's character has talcen a turn for the worse, just like Medea. When she 
blinds Polymestor and has his children killed, she is obsessed with revenge 
and lives only to hurt him. She mocks and takes delight in his pain. The 
possibility that she might return to her old self is implausible. There can 
be no return from the dark place where Hecuba now dwells. But unlike 
Medea, the details of the story inspire pity rather than revulsion. 
Hecuba has no tragic character flaw that fate exploits. She is a good 
person. She has lost almost everything in the fall ofTroy and she has borne 
the losses nobly. When she learns that the Greeks mean to sacrifice her daugh-
ter, she understandably wonders whether life can be worth living. When 
Odysseus comes to claim Polyxena, she has reason aplenty for bitterness, 
but she bears up with dignity. During the siege, Hecuba held Odysseus's 
life in her hands when Helen recognized him as a spy. Hecuba spared his 
life, and Odysseus repays the debt by arguing for Polyxena's death. When 
Hecuba brings the debt to his attention, the plea falls on deaf ears. Odysseus 
mouths galling platitudes about honour. Faced by such unfairness and loss, 
Hecuba finds cold comfort in how Polyxena faces her death. In the midst 
of her grief she takes solace in the supposed immutability of good character 
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and the enduring moral order of the cosmos: "Human nature never changes: 
I the bad stay bad to the end; I the good, even touched by disaster, I are as 
changeless as the stars." The rest of the play proves Hecuba's comfort base-
less. 
At this point, Hecuba is no bloodthirsty monster; she is a woman 
who has suffered beyond imagination, someone hanging on by a thin psy-
chological rope. Only when she learns of her son's murder and is denied 
any justice does she suffer the death of everything save revenge. Everyone 
she cares about and everything she can have faith in has been destroyed. 
The guest-friend relation between Polymestor and Hecuba is a solemn one. 
Polymestor's betrayal shakes the moral order of Hecuba's universe. She could 
expect nothing better than the Greeks to slay her children and reduce her 
to slavery; such are the cruel rules of war. Polymestor's blow is different in 
kind. 
Unlike Medea, who acknowledges nothing important but Jason, 
Hecuba's many loves are systematically destroyed until she has nothing left. 
So long as Polydorus lives, Hecuba can have some comfort in the world, 
albeit mixed with unimaginable loss. A least she can live for Polydorus in a 
key sense. When he is coldly murdered by Polymestor, what could sustain 
her? What might we offer Hecuba? Books? Hobbies? Travel? Old memo-
ries? Faith in a loving God? Many have been sustained through hard times 
by faith. Yet, perhaps they have simply had it easy compared to Hecuba. 
There is Job, but he seems like a feat of biblical imagination rather than a 
plausible example of human psychology. Consider Job's descendants. Few 
Jews emerged from the Holocaust with a firm conviction that what they 
had gone through was part of a benevolent God's master plan. Fewer still 
would have made it at all without the hope that someone cared. Hecuba 
doesn't have the luxury of a sympathetic audience. Facing the life she faces 
is bad enough. When Agamemnon expresses sympathy but refuses to grant 
her justice, he adds insult to profound injury. What this says to Hecuba 
is something like this: We refuse to acknowledge your loss and share your 
outrage; you are utterly, completely alone in your anger, so do what you 
will. We should not be surprised if such a world with such a message brings 
out monstrous anger. Beastly rage can be the last gasp of a dying life. 
Anger does not do in Hecuba in any sense that should leave the 
impression that there would be much left without her anger. Hecuba is 
a good person with loving attachments and commitments. Grief by itself 
would be enough to desolate her character. People who lose everything and 
can no longer sustain the conviction that there is a trustworthy moral order 
are never more than a shell of themselves. They may not slide all the way 
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into vice but surely they cannot hold on to all their good qualities either. 
Hecuba's anger completes a disintegration that is integrally tied to being a 
loving woman. 
Nevertheless, there is no denying the grave difference between a 
Hecuba who gives into despair and one who transforms into a dark avenger. 
We should understand her metamorphosis as a function oflove and respect. 
Because she loves her son and takes justice seriously, she suffers indignant 
rage, a rage that hardens into hatred. If she cared less for her loved ones 
and less about justice, she might avoid her metamorphosis. But if she cared 
less, she wouldn't be the good person she is before her transformation. The 
vital question is whether Hecuba's fate is evidence of great anger's inherent 
inhumanity. 
Looming in the background of Hecuba's case are two rival perspec-
tives that are deeply at odds. With the first, the aspiration is to understand 
the roots of wrongdoing, to understand what brings this person to do this 
particular bad thing. The emphasis is on the possibility for redemption, 
remorse, and change for the better; the evil deed itself is seen against the 
context of the whole person and the potential for goodness. The hope is that 
there might be some common ground of understanding where people who 
are deeply at odds can share an understanding of justice and an eventual 
reconciliation born from the mutual commitment to do right by one an-
other. This is a view that hopes victims and victimizers can beat their swords 
into ploughshares as they come to see each other as human beings worthy 
of respect and compassion. On this view, anger is an affliction, a suffering 
voice crying out in the wilderness for the restoration of human solidarity, a 
voice that laments the terrible rift that wrongdoing inflicts between human 
beings. 
This is an attractive view. Of course, the thought of incorrigible evil-
doers changing their ways is pure nonsense, at best a piece of philosophical 
fantasy, and a potentially pernicious one at that. But anyone with a sense of 
history knows that many horrible things have been done by decent people 
caught up in angry violence. This perspective targets decent people caught 
in the throes of potentially corrosive anger. Perhaps we can save good people 
from grave deeds if we can only defuse their understandable anger. 
The second perspective is darker but no less human. On this view, 
our deepest attachments and commitments define us . Our loves shape our 
orbit and fuel our passage through life. Serious threats or harms to what or 
whom we love attack us at the center of our being. Such attacks close the 
door to any compassionate yearning to know chose who harm us or those 
we love. Homer's Achilles sees one thing when he sees Hector: This is the 
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man who has killed my Patroclus; today he must pay the price. Achilles has 
no interest in seeing the world from Hector's point of view. He does not 
want to think about the suffering that his family will experience. He does 
not want to be his friend. He cares nothing for any remorse Hector might 
have. When he kills Hector he is not driven by a detached attachment to 
some principle. He is driven by love and honour to revenge. 
Of course, Hector's crime is hardly injustice. He has killed Patroclus 
and this is nothing more than we could expect from any warrior. One might 
insist that he is a party to Paris's theft of Helen. But this has nothing to do 
with Achilles's wrath. No abstract principle fuels Achilles's rage. Hector has 
wronged him only by killing his friend. For this Hector must die. Surely we 
can understand how Achilles experiences this as a wrong in the most basic, 
fundamental sense. After all, Hector has slain Achilles's closest friend in the 
world, a friend for whom Achilles feels responsible. 
I think that the conventional view is that Achilles's wrath is a moral 
strike against him. Maybe I am wrong about this. But ifl am not, I would 
temper any simple judgment. l should say that it is a good thing that we do 
not let revenge run rampant. Locke was right: We are partial in judging our 
own case; we tend to mete out more punishment than is warranted; those 
in the right haven't always the might to exact punishment; the assurance 
of impartial judgment and punishment can prevent a cycle of retaliation. 
And though Locke didn't mention it, sometimes we are given a gift when 
we ::ire prohibited from acting on our great anger. We would be a lot better 
off with people who are slow to anger, particularly where the stakes aren't 
so high. 
But sometimes the stakes are high. I do not know what more to say 
to anyone who denies this. When the stakes are high, great anger is a reflec-
tion of who we are at our core. Consider anger's roots. Anger and grief drink 
from the same source and neither is comfortable to experience or witness. 
Grief can change a person episodically or constitutionally. We hope that 
the loss can be limited, that something can be salvaged from grief's wreck. 
But if we love and respect a grieving person we do not dismiss the grounds 
of grief We do not ask the mourner to "get over it" and "move on." Grief 
should not be seen as an affiiction along the lines of a disease. The price of 
immunity from grief would be the obliteration or distortion oflove. Paying 
this price or asking anyone to pay it would dishonour the mourner. Grief 
should command solemn respect. 
As it is with grief, so it is with appropriate anger. And because anger 
is tied to caring, I understand Achilles's wrath and identify with his rage, 
just as I can understand Hecuba even as I pity her. Mind you, I am glad for 
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Achilles's return from darkness at the end of the Iliad. Homer's scene with 
Achilles and Priam is equal parts grace and insight. The sight of a grieving 
Priam stirs Achilles's compassion by occasioning thoughts of his own father. 
And these thoughts bring Achilles back from his dark world. 
So he spoke, and stirred in rhe orher a passion of grieving for his own farher. He 
took rhe old man's hand and pushed him gently away, and the rwo remembered, 
as Priam huddled at rhe feet of Achilleus and wept close for manslaughrering 
Hekror and Achilleus wept now for his own farher, now again for Parroklos. The 
sound of rheir mourning moved in rhe house. Then when great Achileus had 
taken full satisfaction in sorrow and rhe passion for it had gone from his mind 
and body, rhereafrer he rose from his chair, and rook rhe old man by rhe hand, 
and set him on his feet again, in piry for the grey head and grey beard, and spoke 
to him and addressed him in winged words: "Ah, unlucky, surely you have had 
mucb evil to endure in your spirit. How could you dare ro come alone to rhe 
ships of rhe Acbaians and before my eyes, when I am one who have killed in 
such numbers sucb brave sons of yours? The heart in you is iron. Come, rhen, 
and sir down upon rhis chair, and you and I will even !er our sorrows lie still in 
the heart for all our grieving.2 ' 
In this scene we see the tension between the two perspectives that are 
at the heart of our humanity. Take away our capacity for compassion and 
you twist and deform us. We should mourn compassion's death in Hecuba, 
just as we should herald its return to Achilles. In her case a good woman 
has been laid bare and permanently stripped of everything save anger and 
hate. But take away our capacity for great anger in the face of threats and 
harms to what or whom we love and you threaten our capacity to care as we 
cherish caring and being cared for. One can try to construct a psychology 
that defuses anger by creating compartments and labyrinths where anger 
gets lost or spends itself Practically speaking, I have doubts about the wis-
dom of such strategies. Anger silenced or driven underground usually finds 
some fault line to escape. True enough, entire cultures or subcultures can 
educate people to bury their anger. With this kind of education, we run 
the grave risks of misplaced, misdirected anger. Today's denied anger can 
be tomorrow's explosion. Certainly we know well from empirical examples 
of grief that thwarted grief usually reverberates in the recesses of a life and 
character. 
Yet even if some such strategy works, the strategy dishonours anger 
and disfigures integrity. Both grief and anger testify to what a life is about. 
If tragedy mikes and my loved ones meet with a bad end, whether through 
wrongdoing or bad luck, my anger and grief will be expressions of my fimda-
2 Homer, Iliad, trans. Richard Larrimore (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1961) 488. 
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mental attachments. They will express who I am. There is nothing poignant, 
beautiful, or beneficial about living through such a tragedy. Watching a good 
tragedy is one thing; living one is another, and every tragedy is nothing but 
hell. Profound anger is neither pretty nor pleasurable; such anger is simply 
an essential element in any character with commitments and attachments 
that define the self 
In the same breath, it is worth stressing once again that much of 
the anger we witness is a grave mark against the angry person's character. 
Not all anger is great anger. Agamemnon epitomizes petty indignation and 
destructive macho anger. With the siege going badly, the Greeks learn that 
Apollo is punishing them for Agamemnon's refusal to ransom a concubine. 
Agamemnon reluctantly agrees to return her but only if a suitable replace-
ment is found. When Achilles assures Agamemnon that there are no such 
prizes left to give and asks him to trust that he will be repaid when Troy falls, 
Agamemnon threatens to take some fellow Greek's concubine. Agamemnon 
is driven by nothing better than petty indignation: He cannot suffer a blow to 
his status. At a time like this, small thoughts should not enter a commander's 
mind. Achilles responsibly warns him against dishonouring a fellow Greek. 
He reminds Agamemnon that these men are fighting the Trojans as a favour 
to him and his brother. As Achilles points out, no Trojan has ever wronged 
him and yet he fights, contenting himself with a smaller share of the prizes 
even though he does the lion's share of the fighting. If Agamemnon persists 
with his selfish plan, then Achilles sees no point in fighting on his hehalf. 
Achilles's words are a justified reproach to Agamemnon's rash threat. Bu.t 
far from seeing the wisdom of his words, Agamemnon takes direct aim at 
him. His response is macho anger at its worst. The threat to take Briseis is 
the exclamation point to a humiliating public affront. 
The Agamemnons of the world give anger a bad name. Achilles's 
anger is fearsome but he is no Agamemnon. Certainly there is nothing to 
glorify in Achilles's horrific rage when he mercilessly wades through Trojan 
blood to get to Hector. Solemn respect and understanding for anger and 
glorification of the same are different things. Knowing what we know about 
warfare's effects, we should refrain from painting Achilles as a monster. Take 
a person with deep loves and honour and induce prolonged stress accom-
panied by a sense terrible wrong and you are likely to get an Achilles. 
Forgiveness for grievo11s wrones is not always a possibility. Sometimes 
anger can only be managed, the way we manage grief's losses. Some wounds 
prohibit complete recovery, and not because the victim is flawed or weak. 
Great anger that cannot subside usually hardens into some form of hate. 
We are used to thinking of hate as a spiritual cancer. Perhaps the lion's share 
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of the world's hate should be put to rest as senseless hate. But suppose, like 
Nancy Venable Raine, you are a victim of profound, undeniable brutality. 
If you are fortunate, anger can spend itself and you can move on. But no 
matter what happens, what happened could never fade into something 
inconsequential. Could you imagine wishing your assailant well or having 
no feelings about him? I doubt it. I find it difficult to imagine not having 
deeply entrenched, persistent, powerful desires for no good to come to this 
man. This is nothing less than hate. If you are lucky, your life would not 
be consumed by hate. But calling hate by another name does not change 
its nature. We fear the word "hate," and not simply because senseless hare 
has left brutal scars on human history. Hate of any kind is always a burden, 
a burden we can hardly wish on anyone we love. But the same is so for 
grief 
Senseless, misguided hate is easy to reject. But suppose we know 
enough about a someone to know that his brutal deeds are consistent with 
his character or that the evil of his deeds eclipses any "redeeming" elements 
of his character? Suppose we spent time with Nancy Venable Raine's rapist. 
Suppose we saw some kindness. Perhaps he is good to his dog or generous 
with his buddies. O~e way we can head off hate is to remind ourselves of 
the humanity of victimizers. This can be enough to head off implacable 
hate. Bur depending on the details, the sensible result can also be hate. The 
shreds of goodness can be too small or irrelevant when juxtaposed with the 
enormity of the evil. 
The idea that hate might have some legitimate place in a good 
person's life may itself seem hateful. The idea that good people must never 
wish intentional harm on others for its own sake has a long history. After 
all, isn't the desire to inflict suffering on Nancy Venable Raine's assailant 
a mirror image of the assailant's brutality? The avenger seeks to even the 
score. Of course, revenge is ofren futile in the sense of literally evening rhe 
score or erasing rhe harm. Even if Nancy Venable Raine's rapist were to be 
tortured, his suffering would not change what was done to her. No revenge 
that Hecuba might take could restore Polydorus. Hector's death and defile-
ment cannot end Achilles's suffering. 
Dire warnings about the futility of hate and revenge make sense. We 
cannot be restored from the worst wrongdoings; there is no balm for these 
wounds and ta.king revenge never makes us whole. Innocence lost is lost 
for good. And when we go down the road of acting on our understandable 
hate, we often invite new suffering into our lives. But the vilification of 
the desire to return bad for bad is nothing more than a pernicious slogan, 
a dogmatic platitude that dishonours emotions that are central to us. This 
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desire is merely the flipside of the commendable desire to return good for 
good. We curb personal revenge with a justice system, and we are wise to 
do so. But the roots of justice and revenge drink from the same waters; they 
share a genealogy. 
The truth is that we cannot leave the capacities for anger and hatred 
behind without changing elements of human character that most of us prize. 
Some may contend that these elements are overvalued, that their alteration 
would be worth the price to eliminate anger and hatred's ill effects. But most 
of us would not make the deal. If a Gandhi can love a sadistic killer, then he 
does not love people the way most of us do. An admirer may say that this 
is precisely the point. I will not disparage Gandhi's love. But this is not a 
parent's love. Neither is it the love of a brother, sister, son, daughter, friend, 
or romantic partner. Try as we may to sanitize our emotions, attachments, 
and commitments, we must face the fact that there are inherent dark sides 
to the things that matter to us. If we are honest, we must face ourselves as 
we really are. 
While we must not dishonour anger, we must not love anger itself 
We can be drawn in by its seductive charms. No life is better for the mis-
fortune and grief of having just cause for anger. We should do our best to 
shape the capacity for anger in ways that do justice to the loves that define 
us, taking care to discriminate between those things that matter and the 
things that matter less. A good world will educate the Agamemnons to leave 
their anger behind and eliminate the circumstances that breed a Hecuba. 
Great anger should be a precious commodity, used sparingly and only when 
the circumstances demand it. 
We have no ready term to name the virtue that shapes, moderates, 
and mobilizes anger. This is a pity. Given our world, the capacity for anger, 
even extreme anger, comes with the territory. Some things should make us 
very mad. When American forces liberated the death camps, many com-
manders forced German citizens to tour the camps so that they might see the 
horrors with their own eyes. These orders were a manifestation of profound 
indignation and a call to our shared humanity: Look upon these wretched 
sights with shame for what human beings didn't do, anger for what they did, 
compassion for what was suffered, and a firm resolve to never allow these 
horrors again. ·No doubt the gesture was not lost on the survivors. Finally, 
someone cared enough to be angry. 
